A dynamic Cournot duopoly game, characterized by finns with bounded rationality, is represented by a discrete-time dynamical system of the plane. Conditions ensuring the local stability ofa Nash equilibrium, under a local (or myopic) adjustment process, are given, and the influence ofmarginal costs and speeds of adjustment of the two finns on stability is studied. The stability loss ofthe Nash equilibrium, as some parameter ofthe model is varied, gives rise to more complex (periodic or chaotic) attractors. The main result of this paper is given by the exact detennination ofthe basin of attraction ofthe locally stable Nash equilibrium (or other more complex bounded attractors around it), and the study of the global bifurcations that change the structure ofthe basin from a simple to a very complex one, with consequent loss ofpredictability, as some parameters of the model are allowed to vary. These bifurcations are studied by the use of critical curves, a relatively new and powerful method for the study of noninvertible two-dimensional maps.
Introduction
The static Cournot oligopoly model, in which each firm, given the optimal production decisions of the other firms selling the same homogeneous good, sets its optimal production, is a fully rational game based on the following assumptions:
(i) each firm, in taking its optimal production decision, must know beforehand all its rivals' production decisions taken at the same time; (ii) each firm has a complete knowledge of the market demand function.
players' behavior is not fully rational. For example, a dynamic model is obtained if assumption (i) is replaced by some kind of expectation on the rivals' outputs. The simplest kind of expectation, based on Cournot's assumption that each firm, in taking its optimal decision, guesses that the output of the other firms remains at the same level as in the previous period, has given rise to a flourishing literature on dynamic oligopoly models, starting from the seminal paper of Teocharis [18] (see, e.g., McManus and Quandt [11], Fisher [6] , Hahn [10] , and Okuguchi [15] ).
Models where also assumption (ii) is relaxed have recently been proposed by many authors, e.g., Bonanno and Zeeman [3] , Bonanno [2] , and Sacco [16] . In these models firms are supposed to have a knowledge of demand function limited to a small neighborhood of the status of the market in which they operate, and use such local knowledge to update their production strategy by a local profit maximization. Since they play the game repeatedly, they can gradually adjust their production over time. In these dynamic models a Nash equilibrium, if it exists, is a stationary state, i.e., if all the firms have outputs at the Nash equilibrium, their production decisions will remain the same forever. Instead, if the oligopoly system is outside a Nash equilibrium, then the repeated local adjustment process may converge to the Nash equilibrium, where there is no further possibility for improvement, or may move around it by a periodic or aperiodic time evolution, or may irreversibly depart from it. Thus the main question addressed in the literature on dynamic oligopoly models is that ofthe stability ofthe Nash equilibria, and how such stability is influenced by the model structure and the values ofthe parameters which characterize the model. Results of global asymptotic stability, which means that the adjustment process converges to the Nash equilibrium independently of the initial condition, have been given both for linear models, by the analysis of the eigenvalues of the model, and for nonlinear models by the second Lyapunov method, as in Rosen [17] . On the contrary, the question of stability extent in models, in which global stability does not hold, has been rather neglected in the literature. In fact, for nonlinear models, the analysis is often limited to the study of the linear approximation, but these results are in general quite unsatisfactory for practical purposes, since they determine the attractivity ofa Nash equilibrium only for games starting in some region around the equilibrium, and such a region may be so small that every practical meaning of the mathematical concept of stability is lost. In these cases the question of the stability extent, that is, the delimitation of the basin of attraction of a locally stable equilibrium, becomes crucial for any practical stability result. In fact, only an exact determination of the boundaries of the basin of attraction can give a clear idea of the robustness of an attractor with respect to exogenous perturbations, always present in real systems, since it permits one to understand ifa given shock offinite amplitude can be recovered by the endogenous dynamics of the system, or if it will cause an irreversible departure from the Nash equilibrium.
The present paper moves toward this less explored direction. We propose a nonlinear, discrete-time, duopoly model, where a Nash equilibrium exists that is, under given conditions on the model's parameters, locally asymptotically stable, but not globally stable.
The adjustment mechanism considered in this paper is based on the pseudogradient of the profit functions, i.e., each player changes its own production so as to obtain the maximum rate of change of its own profit with respect to a change in its own strategy. Such an adjustment has been proposed, in a continuous time model, by Rosen [17] , and similar mechanisms are also considered by Furth [8] , Sacco [16] , Varian [19] , and Flam [7] . In the paper by Rosen it is shown that, under the assumption of strict diagonal concavity of the payoffs, the unique equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable. In this paper we show that if a discrete-time model is considered the situation is more complex, since even if the conditions for stability required by Rosen are satisfied, local stability does not imply global stability.
The plan ofthe paper is as follows. A detailed description ofthe model is given in Section 2. In Section 3 the existence and local stability ofthe equilibrium points ofthe model are studied. The main results ofthe paper are given in Section 4, where the exact delimitation ofthe basin ofattraction ofthe Nash equilibrium is obtained. The occurrence, as some parameter is allowed to vary, ofsome global bifurcations causing qualitative changes in the structure of the basins is studied by the use of critical curves, a powerful tool for the analysis of noninvertible maps of the plane. In this section we also show that even when the Nash equilibrium becomes unstable, the process may be characterized by periodic or chaotic trajectories which are confined in a bounded region around the Nash equilibrium, so that the duopoly system continues to have an asymptotic behavior which is not far from optimality.
In any case, the global analysis of the dynamical system reveals that bifurcations can occur, as some parameter is left to vary, that cause qualitative changes in the structure of the basins of attraction.
The Duopoly Model: Assumptions and Notations
We consider an industry consisting of two quantity-setting finns, labeled by i = 1, 2, producing the same good for sale on the market. Production decisions of both firms occur at discrete-time periods t = 0, 1,2, .... Let qi(t) represent the output of the ith firm during period t, at a production cost Ci(qi). The price prevailing inperiodt is determined by the total supply Q(t) = q\(t)+q2(t) through a demand function
from which the single-period profit of ith firm is given by (1) (2) As stressed in Section 1, we assume that each duopolist does not have a complete knowledge of the demand function, and tries to infer how the market will respond to its production changes by an empirical estimate of the marginal profit. This estimate may be obtained by market research or by brief experiments of small (or local) production variations performed at the beginning ofperiod t (see Varian [19] ) and we assume that even if the firms are quite ignorant about the market demand, they are able to obtain a correct empirical estimate of the marginal profits, i.e., i = 1,2. (3) Of course, this local estimate ofexpected marginal profits is much easier to obtain than a global knowledge of the demand function (involving values of Q that may be very different from the current ones). With this kind of information the producers behave as local profit maximizers, the local adjustment process being one where a firm increases its output if it perceives a positive marginal profit ct>j(t), and decreases its production if the perceived ct>j(t) is negative. This adjustment mechanism has been called by some authors myopic (see Dixit [5] and Flam [7] ).
Let GjO, i = 1,2, be an increasing function, such that i = 1,2. (4) Then the dynamic adjustment mechanism can be modeled as i = 1,2, (5) where CXj(qj) is a positive function which gives the extent of production variation ofthe ith firm following a given profit signal ct>j. It is important to note that a Nash equilibrium, if it exists, is also a fixed point of the dynamical system (5). In fact, a Nash equilibrium is located at the intersection of the reaction curves, defined by (8ni/8qj)(ql, q2) = 0, i = 1,2 (as noticed by Dixit [5] , the term "reaction curve" is not appropriate in models like (5), since they describe a simultaneousmove game, but we follow the tradition ofusing the same term also in this context). Since (4) implies Gj(O) = 0, i = 1,2, the dynamic process (5) is stationary if the strategy point (ql' q2) is at a Nash equilibrium. The converse is not necessarily true, that is, stationary points of (5) that are not Nash equilibria can exist, as we shall see in the particular model studied in the following.
An adjustment mechanism similar to (5) has been proposed by some authors, mainly with continuous time and constantCXj (see, e.g., Rosen [17] , Furth [8] , Sacco [16] , Varian [19] , and Flam [7] ). However, we believe that a discrete-time decision process is more realistic since in real economic systems production decisions cannot be revised at every time instant. We also assume that CXj are increasing functions ofqj (hence ofthe "size" of the firm). This assumption captures the fact that in the presence of a positive profit signal ct>j > 0, a bigger firm has greater capacity to make investments in order to increase its production, whereas in the presence ofa negative profit signal a bigger producer must reduce more drastically its production to avoid bankruptcy risks.
where Vj is a positive constant that will be called speed ofadjustment. We also assume a linear demand function f(Q) =a -bQ with a, b positive constants, and linear cost functions
where the positive constants Cj are the marginal costs. With these assumptions
and the marginal profit for firm i at the point (q\, q2) of the strategy space is
(10) uqj
If, as in the quoted papers of Varian, Furth, Flam, and Sacco we consider a linear adjustment function
the model (5), with the above assumptions, gives rise to the following twodimensional nonlinear map T (q" q2)~(q;, q2) defined as
where I denotes the unit-time advancement operator, that is, if the right-hand side variables are productions ofperiod t, then the left-hand ones represent productions of period (t + 1).
The map (12) is a noninvertible map of the plane, that is, starting from some nonnegative initial production strategy (q\o, q2o) (13) the iteration of(12) uniquely defines the trajectory (q\(t), q2(t» = Tt(q\o' q2o), t = 1,2, ... , whereas the backward iteration of (12) is not uniquely defined. In fact, a point (q; , q2) of the plane may have several preimages, obtained by solving the fourth-degree algebraic system (12) with respect to q\ and q2 (see Mira et al. [12] for a complete treatment ofthe properties ofnoninvertible maps of the plane). The study of the dynamical properties of (12) allows us to have information on the long-run behavior of a bounded rationality adjustment process starting from a given initial condition (13) , and how this is influenced by the parameters of the model.
Equilibrium Points and Local Stability
We define equilibrium point (or stationary point) of the dynamic duopoly game as a nonnegative fixed point of the map (12), i.e., a solution of the algebraic system (14) obtainedbysettingq; = qi, i = I, 2,in (12) . We can have at most four fixed points:
which will be called boundary equilibria, and the fixed point E* = (qj, qi), with provided that
It is easy to verify that the equilibrium point E*, when it exists, is the unique Nash equilibrium, located at the intersection of the two reaction curves given by the two straight lines which represent the locus ofpoints ofvanishing marginal profits (10) . In the following we shall assume that (16) are satisfied, so that the Nash equilibrium E* exists. An important feature of the map (12) is that it can generate unbounded (i.e., divergent) trajectories (this can also be expressed by saying that (12) has an attracting set at infinite distance). In fact, unbounded (and negative) trajectories are obtained if the initial condition (13) is taken sufficiently far from the origin, i.e., in a suitable neighborhood of infinity, since if qiO > (I + a -Ci)/bvi, i = 1,2, then the first iterate of (12) gives negative values q; < 0, i = 1,2, so that the successive iterates give negative and decreasing (16) hold. This implies that any attractor at finite distance cannot be globally attracting in 1R~, since its basin of attraction cannot extend out of the rectangle
The study of the local stability of the fixed points is based on the localization, on the complex plane, of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of (12)
It is easy to prove that whenever the equilibrium E* exists (i.e., (16) are satisfied), the boundary fixed points E i , i = 0, 1,2, are unstable. In fact, at Eo the Jacobian
whose eigenvalues, given by the diagonal entries, are greater than 1 if CI < a and C2 < a. Thus Eo is a repelling node with eigendirections along the coordinate axes. At E I the Jacobian matrix becomes a triangular matrix
whose eigenvalues, given by the diagonal entries, are AI = 1 -VI (a -CI), with eigenvector r~l) = (1,0) along the ql-axis, and A2 = 1
EI is a saddle point, with local stable manifold along the ql-axis and the unstable one tangent to r~2), if
otherwise E I is an unstable node. The bifurcation occurring at VI = 2/(a -CI) is a flip bifurcation at which E I from attracting becomes repelling along the qI-axis, on which a saddle cycle of period 2 appears.
The same arguments hold for the other boundary fixed point E 2 . It is a saddle, with local stable manifold along the q2-axis and the unstable one tangent to r~2) =
otherwise it is an unstable node. Also, in this case, the bifurcation that transforms the saddle into the repelling node is a flip bifurcation creating a 2-cycle saddle on the q2-axis.
To study the local stability of the Nash equilibrium we consider the Jacobian matrix at E*
Its eigenvalues are real because the characteristic equation A 2 -Tr A + Det = 0, where Tr represents the trace and Det the determinant of (22), has positive discriminant
It is easy to realize that Ai < 1, i = 1, 2, since 1 -Tr + Det > 0 when (16) hold, thus a sufficient condition for the local asymptotic stability of E* is defines a region ofstability in the plane of the speeds of adjustment (VI, V2) whose shape is like the shaded area of Figure 1 . This stability region is bounded by the portion of hyperbola, with positive VI and V2, whose equation is given by the vanishing of the left-hand side of (23). For values of (VI, V2) inside the stability region the Nash equilibrium E* is a stable node, and the hyperbola represents a bifurcation curve at which E* looses its stability through a period doubling (or flip) bifurcation. This bifurcation curve intersects the axes VI and V2 in the points AI and A 2 , respectively, whose coordinates are given by and
From these results we can obtain information on the effects of the model's parameters on the local stability of E*. For example, an increase of the speeds of adjustment, with the other parameters held fixed, has a destabilizing effect. In fact, an increase of VI and/or V2, starting from a set of parameters which ensures the local stability of the Nash equilibrium, can bring the point (VI, V2) out of the stability region, crossing the flip bifurcation curve. This destabilizing effect has already been evidenced by many authors (see, e.g., Fisher [6] and Flam [7] ).
Similar arguments apply if the parameters VI, V2, CI, C2 are fixed and the parameter a, which represents the maximum price ofthe good produced, is increased.
In this case, the stability region becomes smaller, as can easily be deduced from (24), and this can cause a loss of stability of E* when the moving boundary is crossed by the point (VI, V2 From these arguments the combined effects due to simultaneous changes of more parameters can be deduced. For example, if E* becomes unstable because of a price increase (due to a shift of the demand curve), its stability can be regained by a reduction of the speeds ofreaction, whereas an increase ofa marginal cost Ci can be compensated for by a decrease ofthe corresponding Vi, i.e., in the presence of a high marginal cost stability is favored by a more prudent behavior (i.e., lower reactivity to profit signals).
Another important property of the map (12) is that each coordinate axis qi = 0, i = 1,2, is trapping, that is, mapped into itself, since qi = 0 gives q; = 0 in (12) . This means that starting from an initial condition on a coordinate axis (monopoly case) the dynamics is confined in the same axis for each t, governed by the restriction ofthe map T to that axis. Such a restriction is given by the following one-dimensional map, obtained from (12) with qi = 0
This map is conjugate to the standard logistic map
through the linear transformation from which we obtain the relation (26) (27) (28) This means that the dynamics of (25) can be obtained from the well-known dynamics of(26). A briefdescription ofthe main features ofthe map (25) is given in Appendix B, because the dynamic behavior ofthe restrictions of T to the invariant axes plays an important role in the understanding of the global properties of the duopoly model.
Basin Boundaries and Their Bifurcations
In Section 3 we have shown that if the conditions (16) are satisfied then the Nash equilibrium E* = (q;, qi) exists, and it is locally asymptotically stable provided that (23) holds true. In this section we consider the question of the stability extent of the Nash equilibrium, or of different bounded attracting sets around it. In the following we call attractor at finite distance, denoted by A, a bounded attracting set (which may be the Nash equilibrium E*, a periodic cycle, or some more complex attractor around E*) in order to distinguish it from the limit sets at infinite distance, i.e., the unbounded trajectories, which represent exploding (or collapsing) evolutions of the duopoly system. We denote by V(A) the basin of attraction of an attractor A, defined as the open set of points (ql' q2) of the phase plane whose trajectories T t (ql' q2) have limit sets belonging to A as t --+ +00. We also denote by V(oo) the basin of infinity, defined as the set of points which generate unbounded trajectories. Let F be the boundary (or frontier) separating V(A) from V(oo). An exact determination of F is the main goal of this section. Indeed, this boundary may be rather complex, as evidenced by the numerical results shown in Figure 2 . In Figure 2 (a) the attractor at finite distance is the Nash equilibrium E*, and its basin of attraction is represented by the white area, whereas the greyshaded area represents the basin ofinfinity. Two typical trajectories are also shown in Figure 2 (a), one converging to E* and one divergent. Notice that in Figure  2 (a) the adjustment process which starts from the grey region, and consequently exhibits an irreversible departure from the Nash equilibrium, starts from an initial production strategy which is closer to the Nash equilibrium than the convergentone, a rather counterintuitive result. In the situation shown in Figure 2(a) , the boundary separating V(A) from V((0) has a fractal boundary, as will be explained below. In Figure 2 (b) the bounded attractor A is a chaotic set, with a multiply connected (or connected with holes) basin of attraction. The same property can be expressed by saying that V((0) is a nonconnected set, with nonconnected regions given by the holes inside V(A) (see Mira et al. [12] or Mira et al. [13] ). In this situation there is a great uncertainty about the long-run behavior of a given adjustment process, since a small change in the initial strategy of the game may cause a crossing ofF. , T-1 (F) = F (see Mira et al. [12] and Mira and Rauzy [14] ). This implies that if a saddle point, or a saddle cycle, belongs to F, then F must also contain all the preimages of such singularities, and it must also contain the whole stable manifold WS (see Gumowski and Mira [9] and Mira et al. [13] ). For example, the saddle fixed points (or the saddle cycles, if (20) or (21) no longer hold) located on the coordinate axes belong to F, and also the invariant coordinate axes, which form the local stable manifold (or inset) of the saddles, are part of F.
Determination of the Basin Boundaries
Let us consider the two segments W j = [0, O~~], where O~~, j = 1, 2, is the rank-l preimage of the origin computed according to the restriction (25), i.e.,
1 + vj (a -Cj ) where Tn represents the set ofall the preimages ofrank-no
In order to compute the preimages in (30) let us consider a point P = (0, p) E W2. Its preimages are the real solutions of the algebraic system obtained from (12) with (q~, q;) = (0, p):
(1 + V2(a -C2»q2 -2bv2qi -bV2QlQ2 = p. From the first of (31) we obtain ql =°or (32) which means that if the point P has preimages, then they must be located either on the same invariant axis or on the line of (32). With Ql = 0 the second equation becomes a second degree algebraic equation which has two distinct, coincident or no real solutions if the discriminant (33) is positive, zero, or negative, respectively. A similar conclusion holds if (32) is used to eliminate a state variable in the first equation of (31). From this we can deduce that the point P can have no preimages or two preimages on the same axis (which are the same obtained by the restriction (25) of T to the axis q2) or four preimages, two on the same axis and two on the line of (32). This implies that the set of the rank-I preimages of the Q2-axis belongs to the same axis and to the line (32) . Following the same arguments we can state that the other invariant axis, Ql, has preimages on itself and on the line of equation (34) It is straightforward to see that the origin 0 = (0, 0) always has four preimages:
_1= Ql ' , -1= ,Q2 ,wereqj , ) = , ,areglven by (39), and by WI and wz, and their rank-l preimages w t l and wi"'l. For this set of parameters the boundary fixed point £1 is a saddle point with local stable manifold along the q\-axis, £z is a repelling node with a saddle cycle of period two around it, since Vz > a!c2' located at the intersection of the lines (32) and (34) (see Figure 3) . In the situation shown in Figure 3 the segments W2 and WI of the coordinate axes, together with their rank-l preimages, belonging to the lines (32) and (34), and labeled by w 2 1 and w 1 1 , respectively, delimitate the quadrilateral region 0 o~l o~l o~l of the strategy space (q1, q2) which is exactly the basin of attraction of E*.
These four sides, given by the segments 0 o~l and 0 o~l of the coordinate axes and their rank-I preimages, constitute the whole boundary F because no preimages of higher rank exist, since w~1 and w~1 belong to the region 20 of the plane whose points (q;, q~) have no preimages, i.e., the fourth degree algebraic system has no real solutions. This fact can be characterized through the study of the critical curves of the noninvertible map (12) (some basic definitions and properties of the critical curves are given in Appendix A; see Mira et al. [13] , for a more complete treatment).
Since the map T is continuously differentiable, the critical curve LC_I is the locus of points in which the determinant of J(ql' q2), given in (17) 
Contact Bifurcations
In order to understand how complex basin boundaries, like those shown in Figure 2 , are obtained, we start from a situation in which F has a much simpler shape, and then we study the sequence of bifurcations that cause the main qualitative changes in the structure of the basin boundaries as some parameter is varied. Such bifurcations, typical of noninvertible maps, can be characterized by contacts of the basin boundaries with the critical curves (see Mira et a1. [13] , and references therein).
The simple shape that the frontier F assumes for values ofthe parameters like those used in figure 4(a) , where the basin of attraction of E* is a simply connected set, is due to the fact that the preimages of the invariant axes, denoted in Figure 4(a) by wi l , i = 1,2, are entirely included inside the region Zo, so that no preimages of higher rank exist. The situation is different when the values of the parameters are such that some portions of these lines belong to the regions Z2 or Z4. In this case, preimages of higher order of the invariant coordinate axes are obtained, which form new arcs of the frontier F, so that its shape becomes more complex. The switch between these two qualitatively different situations can be obtained by a continuous variation of some parameters of the model, and determines a global (or nonclassical) bifurcation (see Mira et al. [13] ). The occurrence of these global bifurcations can be revealed by the study of critical curves. In order to illustrate this, in the rest of this section we fix the marginal costs and the parameters of the demand function at the same values as those used to obtain figures 2, 3, i.e., the same effect of increasing VI can be obtained by decreasing the corresponding marginal cost CI or by increasing the marginal cost C2 of the other finn, whereas a simultaneous increase ofboth VI and V2 is equivalent to a decrease ofthe parameter a in the demand function.
If, starting from the parameters' values used to obtain the simple basin structure of Figure 4(a) , the parameter V2 is increased, the two branches of the critical curve LC move upward. The first global bifurcation of the basin occurs when the branch of LC, which separates the regions Zo and Z2, becomes tangent to F, that is, to one of the lines (34) or (32). In Figure 4 
(E*).
This is the largest hole appearing in Figure 4 (b), and is called the main hole. It lies entirely inside region Z2, hence it has two preimages, which are smaller holes bounded by preimages of rank 3 of the ql-axis. Even these are both inside Z2. So each of them has two further preimages inside Z2, and so on. Now the boundary F is given by the union of an external part, formed by the coordinate axes and their rank-I preimages (34) and (32), and the boundaries of the holes, which are sets of preimages of higher rank of the ql -axis. Thus the global bifurcation just described transforms a simply connected basin into a multiply connected one, with a countable infinity of holes, called an arborescent sequence ofholes, inside it (see Mira et al. [12] for a rigorous treatment of this type of global bifurcation and Abraham et al.
[1] for a simpler and charming exposition).
As V2 is further increased LC continues to move upward and the holes become larger. This fact causes a sort of predictability loss, since a greater uncertainty is obtained with respect to the destiny of games starting from an initial strategy falling in zone of the holes. If V2 is further increased a second global bifurcation occurs when LC crosses the q2-axis at o~l. This happens when condition (40) holds, that is, V2 = 3/(a -C2), as in Figure 5 After this bifurcation the basin D(E*) becomes simply connected again, but its boundary F now has a fractal structure, since its shape, formed by infinitely many peninsulas, have a self-similarity property.
The sequence of pictures shown in Figure 5 is obtained with VI = 0.24 (as in Figure 4) and increasing values of V2. Along this sequence the point (VI, V2) reaches, in the plane of adjustment speeds, the line offlip bifurcations. When this line is crossed the Nash equilibrium E* becomes a repelling saddle point, and an attracting cycle of period 2, say C2, is created near it (as in Figure 5 (b». The flip bifurcation opens a cascade of period doublings, that creates a sequence of attracting cycles ofperiod 2 n followed by the creation ofchaotic attractors, which may be cyclic chaotic areas, like the 2-cyclic one shown in Figure 5(c) , or a unique chaotic area like that of Figure 5 
(d).
If V2 is further increased, new holes, like that denoted by K in Figure 5 (c), appear. These are formed by the rank-I preimages of portions of D((0) which cross Lc(a) passing from 22 to 2 4 , like those evidenced in Figures 5(c,d) . Even in this case, the holes are created after contact between LC and:F, but, differently from the hole H_ I , the hole K does not generate an arborescent sequence ofholes since it has no preimages, belonging entirely to the region Zoo
In Figure 5 (d) the chaotic area collides with the boundary of V (00). This contact bifurcation is known asfinal bifurcation (Mira et al. [13] and Abraham et al.
[1D, and causes the destruction of the attractor at finite distance. After this contact bifurcation the generic initial strategy generates an unbounded trajectory, that is, the adjustment process is not able to approach the Nash equilibrium, independently of the initial strategy of the duopoly game.
It is worth noting that, in general, there are no relations between the bifurcations which change the qualitative properties ofthe basins and those which change the qualitative properties of the attractor at finite distance. In other words, we may have a simple attractor, like a fixed point or a cycle, with a very complex basin structure, or a complex attractor with a simple basin. Both these sequences of bifurcations, obtained by increasing the speeds of adjustment Vi, cause a loss of predictability. After the local bifurcations the myopic duopoly game no longer converges to the global optimal strategy, represented by the Nash equilibrium E*, and even ifthe game starts from an initial strategy very close to E* the duopoly system goes toward a different attractor, which may be periodic or aperiodic. These bifurcations cause, in general, a loss of predictability about the asymptotic behavior of the duopoly system: for example, in the sequence shown in Figure 5 the situation of convergence to the unique Nash equilibrium, as in the static Coumot game, is replaced by asymptotic convergence to a periodic cycle, with predictable output levels, and then by a cyclic behavior with output levels that are not well predictable since the fall inside cyclic chaotic areas and, finally, a situation oferratic behavior, inside a large area of the strategy space, with no apparent periodicity. Instead, the global bifurcations of the basin boundaries cause an increasing uncertainty with respect to the destiny of a duopoly game starting from a given initial strategy, since a small change in the initial condition of the duopoly, or a small exogenous shock during the adjustment process, may cause a great modification to the longrun behavior of the system. Similar bifurcation sequences can also be obtained by increasing the parameter VI by a fixed value of V2. In this case, a contact between LC and wi l , rank-l preimage of the q2-axis, gives the first bifurcation that transforms the basin V(A) from a simply connected into a multiply connected set, with holes near the ql-axis. Situations with values of VI and V2 both near the critical values Vi = 3j(a -Ci), i = 1,2, can give complex basin boundaries near both the coordinate axes, with two arborescent sequences of holes, generated by contacts of LC with the lines (32) and (34). In any case, the computation of the preimages ofthe coordinate axes allows us to obtain, according to (30), the exact delimitation of the basin boundary also in these complex situations. For example, in Figure 6 the preimages of the ql-axis, up to rank-6, are represented for the same set of parameters as that used in Figure 2(b) . It can be noticed that some preimages of rank 5 and 6 bound holes that enter the region Z4, thus giving a faster exponential growth of the number of higher-order preimages. This is the cause for the greater complexity of the basin boundary which is clearly visible in Figure 2 (b). 
Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed a dynamic Cournot duopoly model where the competing firms do not have a complete knowledge ofthe demand function. Owing to this lack of information they behave as local (or myopic) profit maximizers, following an adjustment process based on local estimates of marginal profit. If the marginal costs of both producers are not too high, a noncooperative Nash equilibrium exists, and ifthe behavior ofthe firms is characterized by relatively low speeds ofadjustment such an equilibrium solution is locally asymptotically stable, that is, the local adjustment process converges to the unique Nash equilibrium provided that the duopoly game starts from an initial production strategy inside a well-defined bounded region around the Nash equilibrium.
For higher values of speeds of adjustment the Nash equilibrium becomes unstable and, through period doubling bifurcations, more complex bounded attractors are created around it, which may be periodic cycles or chaotic sets. When the dynamics of the duopoly system become so complicated, the assumption that producers are unable to gain a complete understanding of the structure of the market, and consequently behave myopically, would be even more justified. This adjustment process can also generate unbounded trajectories. Of course, the occurrence ofdivergent sequences ofproduction strategies is a very unrealistic evolution ofthe duopoly game, that simply means that the bounded rationality adjustment mechanism, based on the profit gradients, is completely inadequate to reach optimal, or quasi-optimal, production strategies.
The main result ofthis paper is the exact determination ofthe basin ofattraction ofthe attracting sets, wether it be the Nash equilibrium or a more complex attractor around it. This basin of attraction can have a simple shape, but it can also assume, after some global bifurcations, a very complex structure, which causes a sort of indeterminacy about the destiny of the dynamic game starting from a given initial strategy. In general, an increase in the firms' reactivity to profit signals, measured by the speeds ofadjustment, can have two different effects on the dynamical properties ofthe duopoly model. The first one, already studied in the literature, is given by the destabilization ofthe Nash equilibrium, as discussed above. The second effect, that as far as we know has not yet been studied in the literature, is given by qualitative changes in the structure of the basins of attraction, which can only be revealed by an analysis of the global properties of the nonlinear dynamical system. An exact delimitation of the basin of an attractor of a nonlinear dynamical system is very important in applied models since it gives quantitative information on the possible effects ofexogenous shocks offinite amplitude on the evolution ofthe system. Thus the determination of the global bifurcations, that cause qualitative modifications of the structure of the basins, is important to characterize the robustness of an attractor with respect to external disturbances. In this paper such bifurcations have been studied in detail using critical curves, a relatively new and powerful tool for the study of the global behavior of noninvertible two-dimensional discrete dynamical systems. In the model studied in this paper the main qualitative changes of the global structure ofthe basins, that for nonlinear maps are generally studied only by numerical methods, can be obtained analytically, through the exact determination ofthe curves bounding the basin and the knowledge ofthe critical curves. For this reason the model studied in this paper may also be considered as a pedagogical example for the study of a nonlinear discrete dynamical system of the plane.
Even ifin this paper the analysis is limited to the duopoly case with a particular choice of demand and cost functions, we believe that the main conclusions on the attractors and on the structure of their basins of attraction are indicative of what may happen in more general models, and can be seen as a starting point for the study of similar phenomena in oligopoly models with more than two firms and with more general demand and cost functions.
Appendices

A. Critical Curves
In this appendix we give some basic definitions and properties, and a minimal vocabulary, about the theory ofnoninvertible maps ofthe plane and the method of critical curves. We also give the analytical expression of the basic critical curve LC_ I of the map (12) .
A two-dimensional map can be written in the general form and LC is the rank-l image of LC_I under T, i.e., LC = T(LC_ I ). This is an hyperbola in the plane (ql' q2) with symmetry center in the point «2C¥2 -c¥))/3, (2c¥) -c¥2)/3) and asymptotes ofangular coefficients (-2 ± J3).
Thus LC_) is fonned by two branches, denoted by Lc~l and Lc~l in Section 4. This implies also that LC is the union of two branches, denoted by Lc(a) = T(LC~l) and LC(b) = T(LC~l). Each branch of the critical curve LC separates the phase plane of T into regions whose points possess the same number of distinct rank-l preimages. In the case of the map (12) LC(b) separates the region Zo, whose points have no preimages, from the region Z2, whose points have two distinct rank-I preimages, and Lc(a) separates the region Z2 from Z4, whose points have four distinct preimages. In order to study the action of the multivalued inverse relation T-) it is useful to consider a region Zk of the phase plane as the superposition of k sheets, each associated with a different inverse. Such a representation is known as/oliation of the plane (see Mira et al. [13] ). In the following we recall some of the properties of the dynamic behavior of the map (25). Such properties are well known since such a map is conjugate to the standard logistic map x' = lix(1 -x) through the transfonnation (27).
The map (25) is a unimodal map with the unique critical point C_I (see Figure 8 (conjugate to the fixed points x =°and x = (1-1/Ii), respectively) corresponding to the boundary fixed points of the duopoly map T. The fixed point 0 is always repelling for (25), whereas E j is attracting for°< Vj (a -Cj) < 2. When
vj(a-cj)=2
(38) a flip bifurcation occurs which starts the well-known Feigenbaum (or Myrberg) cascade of period doubling bifurcations leading to the chaotic behavior of (25). Qualitative graphical representation of the foliation associated with the fourth degree noninvertible map (12) . The projections ofthe folds joining two superimposed sheets are the branches ofthe critical curve LC. The arrows show the relation between the foliation and the k distinct rank-one preimages of a point belonging to a region Zk.
Of course, the bifurcation occurring at (38) corresponds to the flip bifurcation of the map T described above, which transforms the saddle point Ej of T into a repelling node. As vj is further increased, or Cj decreased, cycles of (25) of any order are created: every attracting cycle of (25) corresponds to a saddle cycle of T, located on the line qi = 0, with the attracting branch along the invariant axis, and every repelling cycle of (25) Figure 8(b) , the generic trajectory of(25) is divergent (see, e.g., Devaney, [4,
